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on its express guarantee of prior endorsements. The court said that subro-
gation would be allowed as long as the conduct of the insurer and the
insured has not been such as to make the granting of relief unconscionable.
The decision, in parting from the majority view, emphasizes the legal
liability of the bank to the payee, and permits recovery without regard
to comparative equities. In a 1957 decision," the New Hampshire court
allowed an insurer to recover from a collecting bank on the ground that
the unauthorized payment by the bank caused its equities to be inferior
to those of the insurer. The facts of that case are not materially distinguish-
able from those in other cases holding that an unauthorized payment by a
bank is not enough to cause its equities to be inferior. The New Hampshire
court ruled that the defendant bank was liable for conversion by virtue
of a statute," and stated further that the defendant was not found negligent
or liable apart from said statute. It appears that the court based its
equitable finding on legal considerations and therefore found liability
to the insurer more in accordance with principles of law than with principles
of equity. In Aetna, the decision was based on strict legal principles as well
as on equitable principles which tends to indicate a strong willingness to
allow absolute subrogation to the rights of the insured. Since there is no
serious departure of results under legal principles from objectives of equity
and good conscience, it is submitted that a subrogee should stand on the
same footing as the subrogor, as was stated by the New Jersey court.2°
C. RONALD RUBLEY
Partnership—Existing Liability of Retired Partner—Effect of Indemni-
fication Agreement.—White v. Brown.' —White, one of three partners, re-
tired from a partnership under an indemnification agreement with the con-
tinuing partners. Three months later the creditor-appellee was notified of
both White's withdrawal and the indemnification agreement. A short time
thereafter the creditor accepted from the continuing partners twelve promis-
sory notes, each payable monthly for the principal sum of $2000 with interest
at six per cent. These notes were accepted on a debt of $20,659.27 which
was incurred by the partnership prior to White's retirement. The continuing
partners then became insolvent and the creditor sought payment of the
debt from White. The District Court directed a verdict for the creditor.
The retired partner appealed the decision, contending that the evidence
was sufficient to submit to the jury on the issue of an implied release agree-
ment. The appellant also maintained that from the evidence presented a
suretyship relation could have been inferred, and that the retired partner
as surety was discharged from liability on the debt when time for payment
was extended. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
IS Security Fence Co. v. Manchester Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.H. 190,
136 A.2d 910 (1957).
10 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 337, H 21, 23 (1955).
20 Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, supra note 9.
292 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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the lower court. HELD: A jury question was presented as to the release
agreement, and a suretyship and discharge from liability can be inferred to
the extent that prejudice can be shown.
The existing liability of a partner cannot be discharged by his retire-
ment under an indemnification agreement with the continuing partners. But
to what extent a creditor's rights are affected by his knowledge of such
agreement and/or by his subsequent dealings with the continuing partners
presents a different issue. In years past the authorities split in their an-
swers.2 Today the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) provides an answer
in the thirty-eight states which have adopted it?
Even though the District of Columbia is not one of these thirty-eight
jurisdictions, the court in this case accepted the answer provided by the
UPA; however, it did so with qualification. In addition to the court's re-
fusal to adopt fully the solution of the UPA, the sharp dissenting opinion
of Judge Washington and the commercial significance of the issues involved,
necessitate not only a reappraisal of section thirty-six of the UPA but of the
historical alternatives as well.
The appellee contended that, even if an agreement to release the retired
partner and accept in lieu the liability of the continuing partners could
have been inferred, it should not be held binding due to the lack of consid-
eration. It was specifically argued that the case of Regester v. Dodge,4
relied upon by the appellant, is distinguishable in that the creditor there
dealt with a partnership not previously liable on the debt. The creditor's
acceptance of their liability in lieu of that of the old firm clearly established
a novation. It is to be noted that the continuing partners in this case prom-
ised to do only what they were already bound to do.
The court apparently hurried over the consideration issue. This may
be justified in that the continuing partners promised to pay not only the
amount of the original obligation with six percent interest, but an additional
$4000.00, thereby supplying the requisite consideration.2 Justified or not,
a closer examination of the opinion reveals that the court did not pass on
the issue at all but rather relied upon the theory of a release without con-
2 10 Colum. L. Rev. 550 (1910); see Dean & Co. v. Collins, 15 N.D. 535, 108
NM. 242 (1906) (annotated at 9 L.R.A.(n.s.) 49) ; see Crane, Partnership § 79, at
417-28 (2d ed. 1952).
3 For list of states see 7 Uniform Laws Ann. p. xv (Table III).
4 6 Fed. 6 (ED.N.Y. 1881).
5 See Restatement, Contracts § 76(c) (1932), illustration 7. Consideration has been
found where there was a new and separate promise to pay what one was already obli-
gated to pay as a joint obligation because the new and separate promise subjected the
new obligor to an individual suit and judgment in which he was deprived of his defense
of non-joinder of a joint obligor. 1 Corbin, Contracts § 143, at 452-53 (1950);
Lyth v. Ault & Wood, 7 Exch. 669, 155 Eng. Rep. 1117 (1852). In most states joint
obligations are declared to be joint and several thereby reducing the importance of the
non-joinder cases. See Presbrey V. Thomas, 1 App. D.C. 171 (1893). Under the UPA,
partners are jointly liable on contractual debts and obligations of the partnership. This
joint liability is a substantive provision, thereby leaving it to the particular adopting
state to apply its procedural rules through its own statutory or case declaration of
several liability. See UPA § 15 and the Commissioner's Note thereafter. In Ludington v.
Bell, 77 N.Y. 138 (1879), the receipt of a partner's individual obligation was sufficient
consideration for a return promise because as the court said:
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sideration." The social, economic, moral or legal benefits that accrue from
such a radical departure from one of the basic principles of the law of
contracts are not evident. Especially obscure are the benefits derived in
this case where it was conceded that the retired partner suffered no loss
due to reliance upon the creditor's alleged release agreement or his conduct
in general.
The cases relied upon by the majority as support for the theory of
"waiver" are not in point. They support only the propositions that from
conduct and circumstances an intention to release one from liability may
be inferred,7 that a novation requires consideration,' and that a partnership
agreement may be rescinded by the mutual consent of the partners.' No
case can be found which expressly holds that one may waive such a sub-
stantial right without either estoppel,l° consideration," or the existence of
a suretyship relation.
Suretyship usually arises from express agreement?' It has been held,
however, that when a retired partner withdraws from a firm and the remain-
ing partners assume all existing liabilities, the principal-surety relation
extends beyond the immediate parties to any creditor who has notice of the
circumstances?' Consequently, any action by the creditor which would
An individual obligation may be higher security than that of a co-partnership,
and a debt due from partners may not always be as substantial and safe as a
debt against one of them; for such co-partnership debt must first be collected
out of the co-partnership assets and not out of the individual property of the
several partners, until these are exhausted; and then only after individual debts
are fully paid.
Id. at 603.
6 White v. Brown, supra note 1, at 727. UPA § 36(2):
A partner is discharged from any existing liability upon dissolution of the
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such agree-
ment may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor having
knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the busi-
ness.
This section taken literally applies to instances where consideration or estoppel might
be absent.
7 Regester v. Dodge, supra note 4; LeGault v. Lewis-Zimmerman, 28 Wyo. 474,
206 Pac. 157 (1922).
See White v. Brown, supra note I, at 730, where Judge Washington suggests that
no less than an express release should be required because of the fact that it is a natural
and commercially accepted practice to look in the first instance to those who are cur-
rently operating the partnership for payment and perhaps even contract for an extension
of time before seeking satisfaction from a retired partner.
8 See International Harvester Co. v. Layton, 148 Ark. 156, 229 S.W. 22 (1921),
which also turned on the fact that the liability there was incurred after the dissolution
of the firm.
9 LeGualt v. Lewis-Zimmerman, supra note 7.
to Henry v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 265 Ky. 241, 96 S.W.2d 590 (1936). The EPA
was adopted in Kentucky in 1954 (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 362.150 to 362.360 (1955)).
11 Charleston Lumber Co. v. Friedman, 64 W.Va. 151, 61 SE. 815 (1908). The
UPA was adopted in West Virginia in 1953; see W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 4658(1) to 4658(45)
(1955).
72 Restatement, Security § 83(a) (1941).
78 Smith v. She!den, 35 Mich. 42 (1876); Preston v. Garrad, 120 Ga. 689, 48 SE.
118 (1904); Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N.Y. 95 (1876); cf. Swire v. Redman & Holt,
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ordinarily discharge a surety would now discharge the retired partner?*
The court in this case adopted a modified theory of suretyship by operation
of lawl5 and concluded that the retired partner could have been discharged
when the promissory notes extending the time for payment were issued,16
if prejudice could be shown.
It is clear that the creditor who had originally contracted with the
partners on the basis of their joint and several liability is now compelled
to respect one of his former joint obligors as a surety and necessarily accord
to him rights never contemplated at the time of the original contract. In
essence, the creditor's rights have been diminished by the unilateral action
of his debtors. It is difficult to see why the mere notice of an indemnification
agreement should effectuate such basic changes in one's rights when he has
not given his consent. It would not suffice to say that the notice alone does
not diminish the creditor's rights, in that subsequent action by the creditor
is necessary in order to discharge his debtor's liability. This is a post facto
argument, for if suretyship were not already deemed , to be present the
subsequent conduct of the creditor would not have any discharge effect.
Furthermore, the fact that the court modified the theory to one of "compen-
sated suretyshipml does not remove the objection. The court said
On his retirement he could not fairly be said to have acquired the
status of a gratuitous surety, that is, one who obligingly lends
his credit to another; so to consider the matter would be to dis-
[1876] 1 Q.B. 536; A. F. Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Wells, 90 Tex. 110, 37 S.W. 411
(1896); McAreavy v. Magirl, 123 Iowa 605, 99 NM. 193 (1904); see Rawson v.
Taylor, 30 Ohio St. 389 (1876), for an excellent discussion on the merits of the opposing
view. It is to be noted that the UPA which impliedly adopts the suretyship rule in
§ 36(3) was adopted in Ohio in 1949 and hence overrules the Rawson case. See Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 1775.01-1775.42 (Baldwin 1961).
14 Smith v. Sheldon, Preston v. Garrad, Colgrove v. Tallman, supra note 13.
45 White v. Brown, supra note 1, at 728.
46 It is a well-established principle of suretyship law that an extension of time dis-
charges a surety because it increases the possibility that he will be denied full indemni-
fication from the principal. See Restatement, Security § 129(1) (1941). That there
must be consideration for the extension see Eureka Stone Co. v. First Christian Church
of Ft. Smith, 86 Ark. 212, 110 SM. 1042 (1908); People's State Bank of Wellsville v.
Dryden, 91 Kan. 216, 137 Pac. 928 (1914); Atlantic Trust & Deposit Co. v. Union
Trust & Title Corp., 110 Va. 286, 67 SE. 182 (1909). Most courts have held that ac-
ceptance of promissory notes at a lower rate of interest than provided for by the original
agreement also constitutes an extension of time because the debtor relinquishes his
right to pay and stop the running of interest. See Burack v. Mayers, 121 N.J. Eq. 135,
187 All. 767 (1936) ; Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 29 SM. 1061 (1895); Nelson v.
Flagg, 18 Wash. 39, 50 Pac. 571 (1897). Cf. Harburg v. Kumpf, 151 Mo. 16, 52 S.W.
19 (1899) ; Monroe County Say. Bank v Baker, 147 Misc. 522, 264 N.V. Supp. 101
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Wilson v. Powers, 130 Mass. 127 (1881).
17 A gratuitous surety is one who voluntarily lends his credit to another without
compensation. A compensated surety is one who is in the business of credit lending.
See Restatement, Security / 82(i) (1941). A mere extension of time releases a gratui-
tous surety, prejudice being presumed. The discharge of a compensated surety requires
proof of actual prejudice. Restatement, Security 129(2) (1941). See Guaranty Co.
v. Pressed Brick Co., 191 U.S. 416 (1903); In re Tabasinky's Estate, 228 Ia. 1102, 293
NM. 578 (1940) ; Fred Christensen, Inc. v. Hansen Constr. Co., 142 Ore. 549, 21 P.2d
195 (1933) ; City of Philadelphia, ex rel. Thompson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Mary-
/and, 231 Pa. 208, 80 Atl. 62 (1911).
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regard entirely the fact that before his retirement the partnership
relation had imposed upon appellant a primary obligation.18
This supposed equitable consideration was enough to convince the court
to call into play the peculiar status of a compensated surety which itself
was a product of equitable considerations. The court did not mention that
even though the status of a compensated suretyship relation reduces the
otherwise severe impact that would be imposed upon the creditor's rights
if a gratuitous suretyship were involved, the fact nevertheless remains that
the creditor's rights have been unilaterally diminished.
The UPA has codified the principles of release without consideration's
and gratuitous suretyship by operation of law.2° It is submitted that both
principles are undesirable in legal theory and in practical effect. It is un-
fortunate that the court in this case adopted the former principle and modi-
fied the latter, not only because of the inherent inequity in the doctrine,
but also because there existed no compelling statutory or case precedent21
in the jurisdiction.
EDWARD B. GINN
Sales—Unfair Competition—Equitable Servitudes on Chattels.—Inde-
pendent News Co. v. Williams.1—Plaintiff, Independent News Co. (Inde-
pendent), is a large scale distributor of comics; plaintiff, National Comics
Publications Inc., is a publisher of comic books under some forty-five dif-
ferent titles; plaintiff, Superman, Inc., owns the copyright and trademarks
covering the various titles and characters appearing in the comic books.
They brought an action for a preliminary injunction against a secondhand
periodical dealer (Williams) to prevent his selling cover-removed2 comics
purchased by him from waste paper dealers. Williams purchased them from
certain wholesalers who were contractually bound to plaintiff, Independent,
to sell the cover-removed comics as waste paper only. The contracts between
18 White v. Brown, supra note I, at 728.
19 See TJPA 11 36(2) cited in note 6 supra.
20 UPA 36(3):
Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partner-
ship, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from
any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement,
consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of such obli-
gations.
21 White v. Brown, supra note 1.
1 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
2 It must be emphasized that there is a vital difference between a cover-removed
periodical and a secondhand periodical. A secondhand periodical is one which
has been placed on the market and sold. It subsequently, through one channel
or another, finds its way into the hands of a secondhand magazine dealer who
may have collected it himself from a reader or acquired it by purchase from
some other collector. A cover-removed periodical represents one which has had
its cover removed by a Wholesaler who had returned such cover to the Distribu-
tor for full credit. The remains of such a periodical represents the subject matter
of this lawsuit.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-4.
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